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Abstract 
This paper examines the scope of rights of appeal from arbitration awards in New 
Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
In countries that have drafted their legislation after the UNCITRAL Model Law appeals 
are often excluded and only recourse based on very narrow grounds is available. While 
many countries are more permissive with regards to appeals than the Model Law in that 
they allow the parties to opt for more expansive review, none of the examined 
jurisdictions give the parties the right to opt for appeals on questions of law and fact. 
In several cases parties have tried to expand the rights of appeal by agreement. Such 
agreements are deemed invalid in all jurisdictions. When examining whether the invalid 
clause renders the entire arbitration agreement invalid, courts in common law 
jurisdictions have applied the doctrine of severance in some variations. Civil law courts 
usually examine whether the parties would have concluded the contract without the 
invalid clause (“but for”-test). 
This paper suggests that many of these tests are not suitable for arbitration agreements 
where the parties do not exchange considerations but rather promise one another exactly 
the same. The preferable approach is to combine the “but for”-test with a test that 
assesses if severance alters the nature of the agreement. 
 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises exactly 11,965 words. 
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I. Introduction 
It is a truth universally acknowledged that no one likes losing.1 Therefore, a party having 
lost a case will often seek to appeal. However, while the rules of litigation almost always 
provide for rights of appeal against a court of first instance’s judgment, the situation is 
usually different with regard to arbitration awards. 
In that regard, two possible ways to challenge an arbitral award need to be 
distinguished: The first one, which is referred to here as “appeal from arbitral awards”, 
means an application to the courts to modify or correct the award for errors of facts and 
law. The second one will be referred to as “recourse” to the courts. Such recourse is 
defined here as an application to the courts to set aside an award based on selected 
grounds including lack of a valid arbitration agreement or of arbitrability, some severe 
procedural flaws or conflict with the public policy of the state of arbitration. 
Most jurisdictions have taken an arbitration-friendly stance, favouring the finality of 
arbitral awards. Accordingly, rights of appeal from arbitration awards to state courts have 
been cut and rights of recourse have been restricted to the minimum necessary to preserve 
the integrity of both the judicial and the arbitral system.2  
In the past years, cases became public in several countries where the parties 
deliberately chose to incorporate rights of appeal to state courts in their arbitration 
agreement, raising the question of how to deal with such agreements.  
In the jurisdictions examined in this paper the appeal clauses are almost unanimously 
held as invalid. The question then becomes whether the appeal clause invalidates the 
remainder of the arbitration agreement as well. In common law jurisdictions this is a 
matter of the doctrine of severance; in civil law countries the doctrine of partial nullity 
applies.  
The courts in the jurisdictions examined in this paper essentially all follow one of 
three different approaches. Switzerland and some jurisdictions in the United States apply 
  
1 See Nigel Blackaby and others Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th ed (student version), 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at [10.01]; with apologies to Jane Austen. 
2 See Eric van Ginkel “‘Expanded’ Judicial Review Revisited: Kyocera Overturns LaPine” 4 Pepp Disp 
Resol L J 47 at 50. 
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an approach that inquires into whether the parties would have entered into the agreement 
without the invalid clause (“but for”-test). The approach preferred in the Commonwealth 
looks at the contract that the parties have agreed on and permits severance if the 
agreement will still be substantially the same without the clause to be severed. The third 
approach, which is favoured in the United States, puts more emphasis on the construction 
of the contract, allowing severance if the parties’ promises can be divided into distinct 
obligations. 
As will be shown, this author believes that when it comes to appeal clauses in 
arbitration agreements the inquiry should be whether the remaining agreement is still the 
same in its heart and whether the parties would have agreed on arbitration nevertheless. 
Accordingly, a combination of the “but for”-test and the test examining whether the 
nature of the agreement remains unaltered is regarded as the appropriate test.  
This paper will begin with giving an overview of the statutory rights of appeal from 
arbitral awards in some developed jurisdictions. After that, it will be shown how the 
courts in these jurisdictions have treated agreements on rights of appeal. The major part 
of this paper then consists in examining the effects of clauses for rights of appeal on the 
remainder of the arbitration agreement. 
II. Statutory rights of appeal 
A. The rule of the Model Law  
On 21 June 1985 the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration1 (“the Model Law”).3 The Model Law was amended by UNCITRAL on 
7 July 2006.4 
  
3 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law A/40/17(SUPP), Annex I (1985). 
4 Revised articles of the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, and the recommendation regarding the interpretation of article II, 
paragraph 2, and article VII, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law A/61/17(SUPP), Annex 
1 (2006). 
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The Model Law was developed to address disparities in national laws on arbitration 
and further harmonization and improvement of national laws.5 It is to be used as a 
template when drafting a country’s domestic law.6 
The story of the Model Law is one of success. Legislation based on the Model Law 
has been enacted in close to 100 jurisdictions.7 It can therefore be said that it is „the 
single most important legislative instrument in the field of international commercial 
arbitration“8 even though most of the world’s leading international arbitration centers (for 
instance France, England, Switzerland and the United States) have not—at least not en 
bloc—adopted the Model Law.9 
One of the key provisions of the Model Law is art 34, whose paragraph 1 states: 
“Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for 
setting aside in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3) of this article.” 
Article 34(2) of the Model Law enumerates first the grounds for setting aside an 
award that have to be proven by the party making the application: 
• the incapacity of a party to conclude an agreement or invalidity of the 
agreement;10 
• the lack of proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or the arbitral 
proceedings to this party or the party’s inability to present its case;11 
• the award deals with matters outside the scope of the submission to 
arbitration;12 
  
5 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law UNCITRAL 2012 digest of case law on the 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (United Nations, New York, 2012) at 2. 
6 Simon Greenberg, Christopher Kee and J Romesh Weeramantry International Commercial Arbitration: 
An Asia-Pacific Perspective (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011) at [150]. 
7 The UNCITRAL lists the states having enacted legislation based on the Model Law on 
<www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html> (accessed 26 
September 2014). 
8 Gary B Born International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, Austin, 2009) 
vol 1 at 115. 
9 At 121; Greenberg, Kee and Weeramantry, above n 6, at [154]. 
10 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law A/40/17(SUPP), Annex I (1985), art 34(2)(a)(i). 
11 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art 34(2)(a)(ii). 
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• the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement or the provisions of the Model Law.13 
The grounds for setting aside an award that do not have to be proven by the party 
making the application, but instead should be considered by the court on its own 
initiative,14 are found in art 34(2)(b) of the Model Law: 
• the lack of arbitrability of the subject-matter of the dispute under the law in 
force at the seat of arbitration;15 
• a violation of the public policy at the seat of arbitration.16 
It is widely accepted that these setting aside proceedings are not appeal proceedings 
in which the correctness of the arbitral tribunal’s decision on the merits is examined.17 A 
large body of authority underlines that the Model Law does not permit review of the 
merits of an arbitral award, neither in questions of law nor in questions of fact.18  
In addition, art 34 of the Model Law is perceived to be mandatory in the sense that 
the parties are not allowed to expand the grounds for setting aside an award.19 This 
interpretation is not self-evident, as it results from two of the most fundamental features 
of arbitration competing with each other. One of them is party autonomy: the freedom of 
the parties to dictate the aspects of arbitration in any manner that they choose.20 The other 
one is finality: the idea that an arbitrator’s decision is final and binding on the parties and 
may be challenged only on limited grounds.21  
                                                                                                                                                 
12 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art 34(2)(a)(iii). 
13 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art 34(2)(a)(iv). 
14 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, above n 5, at 138–139. 
15 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art 34(2)(b)(i). 
16 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art 34(2)(b)(ii). 
17 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, above n 5, at 134; Greenberg, Kee and 
Weeramantry, above n 6, at [930]. 
18 See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, above n 5, at 140, n 658-660. 
19 Vikram Raghavan “Heightened Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards: Perspectives from the UNCITRAL 
Model Law and the English Arbitration Act of 1996 on some US Developments” (1998) 15 J Int’l Arb 103 
at 125–126; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, above n 5, at 135–136. 
20 Mark D Wasco “When Less is More: The International Split over Expanded Judicial Review in 
Arbitration” (2009) 62 Rutg L Rev 599 at 599, n 1. 
21 At 599, n 2. 
8 SUTER – RIGHTS OF APPEAL 
 
Policy-makers must strike a balance between these two rivalling principles. The 
drafters of the Model Law have taken a stance favouring finality und thus limiting court 
intervention to the cases where the Model Law expressly provides for it.22 The travaux 
préparatoires reveal that the Commission did consider a proposal to allow parties to agree 
on a wider scope of court intervention in the arbitral process.23 In the end, though, 
concerns that parties might end up being subject to a greater degree of court intervention 
than they expected prevailed.24 
B. Firm statutes: United States federal law 
The United States Federal Arbitration Act can today be regarded as one of the statutes 
that are particularly restrictive with respect to appeals from arbitration awards.  
The grounds for setting aside an arbitral award pursuant to § 10 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act are similar to those enumerated in art 34 of the Model Law. The United 
States Supreme Court ruled in Hall Street Associates that § 10 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act is to be read as exclusive.25 However, United States courts have for a long time 
recognized additional common law bases to set aside arbitral awards, in particular the 
manifest disregard doctrine.26 The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street 
Associates thus raises the question if theses grounds can still be applied.27 In a later 
decision the Court expressly left unanswered the question whether the manifest disregard 
doctrine survived the decision in Hall Street Associates.28  
  
22 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law A/40/17(SUPP), Annex I (1985), art 5. 
23 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its eighteenth 
session (A/40/17, annex I 1985) at 62; Howard M Holtzmann and Joseph E Neuhaus A guide to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
Deventer (Netherlands), 1989) at 237–239 cited after Raghavan, above n 19, at 124–125. 
24 Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the work of its eighteenth 
session, above n 23, at 64; Raghavan, above n 19, at 124–125. 
25 Hall Street Associates, LLC v Mattel, Inc 552 US 576 (2008) at 586. 
26 See Gary B Born International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, Austin, 2009) 
vol 2 at 2637 and 2639. 
27 Hall Street Associates, LLC v Mattel, Inc, above n 25, at 586 (holding “the text compels a reading of the 
§§ 10 and 11 categories as exclusive”); Born, above n 26, at 2639. 
28 Stolt-Nielsen SA v AnimalFeeds International Corp (2010) 559 US 662 (2010) at 672, n 3. 
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In any case though the manifest disregard doctrine merely adds to the grounds for 
recourse, whereas Hall Street Associates made it clear that the United States Federal 
Arbitration Act does not allow appeals from arbitration awards. 
C. Opt-in statutes 
Other jurisdictions allow the parties to an arbitration agreement to opt for a more 
expansive appeal from an arbitration award by the courts, while by default providing only 
setting aside proceedings. Examples include New Zealand and the United Kingdom. 
If arbitration proceedings are governed by the law of the United Kingdom, then there 
is, by default, a possibility to appeal from the arbitral award with leave of the court on 
questions of law.29 Such leave is only granted under restrictive circumstances though.30 
Leave by the court is dispensable if the parties to the arbitration have—prior to the 
arbitration or afterwards—agreed on an appeal to the court.31 
New Zealand has essentially established the same procedure on appeals for cases of 
domestic arbitration in cl 5 of sch 2 of the Arbitration Act 1996. In international 
arbitration however, sch 2 of the Arbitration Act 1996 is applicable only if the parties so 
agree.32 If this condition is satisfied, then the parties have the possibility to appeal from 
arbitral awards either with leave of the court33 or as per their agreement.34 
In any case though, in both jurisdictions the appeal can only be made on a question of 
law.35 Appeals on questions of fact are not permissible in either jurisdiction.36  
  
29 See Arbitration Act 1996 (UK), s 69(2)(b). 
30 David St John Sutton Russell on Arbitration (23rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2007) at [8–119]. 
31 At [8–131]. 
32 Arbitration Act 1996 s 6(2)(a). 
33 See Arbitration Act 1996, s 5(1)(c) of sch 2. 
34 Arbitration Act 1996, s 5(1)(a) and (b) of sch 2. 
35 See Arbitration Act 1996, s 5(1) and 5(10) of sch 2; Arbitration Act 1996 (UK), s 69(1). 
36 Guangzhou Dockyards Co Ltd (formerly Guangzhou CSSC-Oceanline-GSW Marine Engineering Co Ltd) 
v Ene Aegiali I [2010] EWHC 2826, [2011] Lloyd’s Rep 30 (Comm) at [17]; Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan 
[2014] NZSC 75 (SC) at [14]. 
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D. Opt-out statutes 
While in the United Kingdom and New Zealand the parties may opt into a more 
expansive judicial review, other jurisdictions (such as Singapore and Switzerland) allow 
for opting out of the application of the law on international arbitration altogether and 
replacing it with the law on domestic arbitration. 
Singapore forms part of the jurisdictions that have incorporated the Model Law in 
their domestic law on international arbitration. Section 3(1) of the International 
Arbitration Act 1994 (SG) states that, subject to this Act and with the exception of 
Chapter VIII on the recognition and enforcement of awards, the Model Law shall have 
the force of law in Singapore. 
This rule applies in particular to art 34 of the Model Law37 even though Singapore 
law provides two additional grounds to set aside an arbitral award: fraud or corruption in 
the making of the award and a breach of natural justice.38 Based on this legislation, 
Singapore courts have held consistently that they will not review the merits of arbitral 
awards:39  
Errors of law or fact made in an arbitral decision, per se, are final and binding on the 
parties and may not be appealed against or set aside by a court except in the 
situations prescribed under s 24 of the Act and Art 34 of the Model Law. 
Section 15(1) of the International Arbitration Act 1994 (SG) however allows the 
parties to an international arbitration agreement to opt out of the application of this Act 
and instead choose the application of the rules for domestic arbitration, which provide for 
appeals on questions of law.40 This opting-out must be done expressly.41 
  
37 See International Arbitration Act 1994 (SG), art 34 of sch 2. 
38 International Arbitration Act 1994 (SG), s 24. 
39 PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2006] SGCA 41, [2007] 1 SLR 597 (SGCA) at 
[57]; see also PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK v CRW Joint Operation [2010] SGHC 202 
(SGHC), [2010] 4 SLR 672 (SGHC) at [10]; Government of the Republic of the Philippines v Philippine 
International Air Terminals Co, Inc [2006] SGHC 206, [2007] 1 SLR 278 (SGHC) at [38]. 
40 See Mohan R Pillay “The Singapore Arbitration Regime and the UNCITRAL Model Law” (2004) 20 
Arbitration International 355 at 366 and 375. 
41 David Howell, Leigh Duthie and Mark Lim “International Arbitration in Singapore: Opting out of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law” (2002) 19 J Int’l Arb 39 at 50. 
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Switzerland is principally one of the more restrictive jurisdictions when it comes to 
appeals from arbitral awards.42 Under chapter 12 of the Bundesgesetz über das 
Internationale Privatrecht 1987 (Federal Act on the Private International Law (PILA)), 
only setting aside proceedings are available, and the grounds to set aside an award are 
procedural (with the exception of the ground of violation of the ordre public).43  
As per art 176(2) of the PILA however, the parties may agree to opt out of the 
application of chapter 12 of the PILA and instead have their arbitration governed by 
part 3 of the Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung44. Pursuant to art 393 of the CPC, an 
arbitral award may be set aside by a court if its outcome is arbitrary because the award “is 
based on findings that are obviously contrary to the facts as stated in the case files or 
because it constitutes an obvious violation of law or equity”.45  
While these setting aside proceedings encompass questions of fact, the standard that 
needs to be met is considerably higher compared to appeals from court decisions where it 
is enough for the appellant to show that the decision is merely wrong, either factually or 
legally: An appeal may be filed on grounds of incorrect application of the law or incorrect 
establishment of the facts.46 
III. Treatment of agreements on (expanded) rights of appeal 
In several jurisdictions some parties to an arbitration agreement have tried to incorporate 
rights of appeal to a court into their agreement. It is not easy to see why parties should do 
so, as such an agreement potentially erases most of the advantages that come with 
  
42 See Jean-François Poudret and Sébastien Besson Comparative Law of International Arbitration (2nd ed, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2007) at [786]. 
43 Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht 1987, art 190(2) (translation: Federal Act on the Private 
International Law); Poudret and Besson, above n 42, at [821], [824]–[827]. 
44 Translation: Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The CPC replaced the Intercantonal Convention on Arbitration 
of 1969 (known as the “Concordat”) in 2011. 
45 Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2011, art 393(e) (translation: Civil Procedure Code) as per the semi-
official translation on <www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20061121/index.html> (accessed 26 
September 2014). 
46 Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung 2011, art 310 (translation: Civil Procedure Code). 
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arbitration (confidentiality, speed). Nevertheless, such cases have occurred, and courts 
have been forced to assess those agreements.47 
A. Invalidity of such agreements 
Agreements on rights of appeal are not precluded by international conventions, in 
particular not by the New York Convention48.49 Whether such agreements are given 
effect to is thus a matter of national law.50  
While some federal courts in the United States used to uphold agreements on rights of 
appeal,51 the overwhelming majority of the courts took a different view: The Supreme 
Courts of both New Zealand52 and the United States53 as well as courts in France54 
declined to give effect to such agreements. Similarly, the High Court of England and 
Wales held it to be “very doubtful” that the parties could agree for an appeal on questions 
of fact.55  
No pertinent decisions of Swiss or Singaporean courts are known to this author. But it 
is presumed that the courts of both Singapore and Switzerland would hold such 
agreements to be invalid as they aim to amend the provisions on the setting aside of 
arbitration awards which are deemed as mandatory.56 In Switzerland this can be derived e 
  
47 See eg Kyocera Corp v Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc 341 F 3d 987 (9th Cir 2003 en banc); Carr 
v Gallaway Cook Allan, above n 36. 
48 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 330 UNTS 
3 (opened for signature 10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 1959). 
49 See Albert Jan van den Berg The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation (Kluwer Law and Taxation, Deventer (Netherlands), 1981) at 157–158. 
50 At 158. 
51 See Born, above n 26, at 2668. 
52 See Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan, above n 36, at [14]. 
53 See Hall Street Associates, LLC v Mattel, Inc, above n 25. 
54 See Emmanuel Gaillard and John Savage Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman On International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999) at [1596] n 159. 
55 See Guangzhou Dockyards Co Ltd (formerly Guangzhou CSSC-Oceanline-GSW Marine Engineering Co 
Ltd) v Ene Aegiali I, above n 36, at [30]. 
56 See Poudret and Besson, above n 42, at [788] (holding that the list of the grounds for invalidity provided 
for in the laws examined is exhaustive and adding in footnote 115, referring to the Kyocera decision: “We 
doubt that this interpretation which is very respectful of the intent of the parties is compatible with the laws 
considered in this book.”). 
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contrario from art 192 of the PILA: While this provision states that non-Swiss resident 
parties may exclude any recourse to the courts or particular grounds for recourse,57 there 
is no corresponding provision for expanding the grounds for recourse.  
A judgment of the German Bundesgerichtshof58 of 200759 is sometimes interpreted as 
giving effect to expanded judicial review clauses.60 This is, however, incorrect as the 
Court merely enforced a clause stating that any party not satisfied with the arbitral award 
could file suit with a competent court within a month after the award had been rendered.61 
It is true that the Court held that arbitration is based on the principle of contractual 
freedom and that the parties are accordingly free to attach certain conditions to their 
being bound to the award.62 A conditional submission of the parties to the arbitral award 
was therefore permissible.63  
However, it is submitted that the crucial point is that such an agreement interferes in 
no way with the procedure provided by the law. The same cannot be said of appeal 
agreements, where the parties seek to amend an appellate court’s jurisdiction. Against 
this background, it should not easily be assumed that the Bundesgerichtshof would allow 
an appeal agreement. While there is no pertinent German judgment available yet,64 
German legal scholars are in the majority of the opinion that the parties may not by 
agreement expand the judicial review of arbitral awards.65 
  
57 Bundesgesetz über das Internationale Privatrecht 1987 (translation: Federal Act on the Private 
International Law) (Switzerland), art 192(1). 
58 Translation: Federal Court of Justice. This is the highest appellate court in Germany for civil and 
criminal cases. 
59 Undisclosed v undisclosed [2007] 25 ASA Bulletin 810, [2008] 33 Yearbook Comm Arb’n 231 (BGH). 
60 See Neida Cunaj “Separability within the arbitration clause with special focus on US jurisdictions” (LLM 
short thesis, Central European University, 2014) at 34 n 156. 
61 Undisclosed v undisclosed, above n 59, at 235; see also Matthias Scherer “Introduction to the Case Law 
Section” (2007) 25 ASA Bulletin 750 at 753–754. 
62 Undisclosed v undisclosed, above n 59, at 235. 
63 At 236. 
64 But see Undisclosed v undisclosed [2006] SchiedsVZ 103 (OLG Naumburg) at 104 (holding obiter that 
the parties cannot expand the grounds for setting aside by agreement). 
65 See eg Stefan Kröll and Peter Kraft “§ 1059 - Application for Setting Aside” in Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, 
Stefan Kröll and Patricia Nacimiento (eds) Arbitration in Germany: the Model Law in Practice (Kluwer 
Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn (The Netherlands), 2007) at [37]; but see Gerhard Wagner “§ 1026 
- Extent of Court Intervention” in Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Stefan Kröll and Patricia Nacimiento (eds) 
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B. Separability of such agreements 
Given the courts’ view of the clauses on rights of appeal as invalid the question arises 
whether the invalidity of said clause renders the entire arbitration agreement invalid. In 
order to prevent consequences of this kind—albeit in different constellations—, the 
doctrine of separability (or autonomy) has been developed. 
The doctrine of separability is a theory well established in jurisdictions all over the 
world. The doctrine states that an arbitration clause contained in a contract is an 
agreement separate from the main contract of which it forms part.66 Thus, it survives the 
main contract’s termination and may be valid despite the main contract’s invalidity.67  
The Model Law has codified the doctrine of separability in art 16(1): 
The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with 
respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an 
arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement 
independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal that 
the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration 
clause. 
The doctrine of separability is today accepted in all developed arbitral jurisdictions, 
including the jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Law.68 Namely, both New 
Zealand and Singapore have adopted art 16(1) of the Model Law.69 
The question therefore arises whether an agreement on rights of appeal from an 
arbitral award is independent of the (basic) agreement to arbitrate. The answer is not self-
evident. An argument can be made—and indeed was made in Carr v Gallaway Cook 
                                                                                                                                                 
Arbitration in Germany: the Model Law in Practice (Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn (The 
Netherlands), 2007) at [8] (arguing agreements on an expansions of judicial review should be honoured). 
66 Born, above n 8, at 311; Gaillard and Savage, above n 54, at [389]; Blackaby and others, above n 1, at 
[2.89]; Greenberg, Kee and Weeramantry, above n 6, at [436]. 
67 Blackaby and others, above n 1, at [2.89]; Born, above n 8, at 357. 
68 Blackaby and others, above n 1, at [2.96] and [2.98]; Greenberg, Kee and Weeramantry, above n 6, at 
[439]; R Doak Bishop, Wade M Coriell and Marcelo Medina Campos “The ‘Null and Void’ Provision of 
the New York Convention” in Emmanuel Gaillard and Domenico Di Pietro (eds) Enforcement of 
Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice 
(Cameron May, London, 2008) 275 at 279. 
69 See Arbitration Act 1996 s 16(1) of sch 1; International Arbitration Act 1994 (SG) art 16(1) of sch 1. 
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Allan70—that the arbitration process, which is the subject matter of the arbitration 
agreement, ends with the award being rendered. Court proceedings that are initiated after 
the award has been made on the other hand are governed by a different regime and, 
consequently, by a different agreement.71 
The underlying question is therefore whether the doctrine of separability applies to 
save the arbitration agreement only from deficiencies of the main contract or also from 
deficiencies in ancillary provisions of the arbitration agreement itself.  
Traditionally, the doctrine of separability has been understood to apply in the former 
cases only.72 The Supreme Court of New Zealand maintained this view in Carr. It first 
noted that the doctrine of separability prevented from the consequence that, “if an 
arbitrator held that there was a defect in the contract that rendered it invalid, this would 
be to determine that the arbitration clause itself was invalid”.73 The Court then went on to 
hold that there was no possibility of such a result “where an arbitration clause is 
contained in a submission agreement that is distinct and separate from the contract to 
which the dispute being submitted to arbitration relates.”74 Thus, the Court concluded, the 
meaning of “arbitration agreement” as per art 16 of the Arbitration Act 1996, which 
codifies the doctrine of separability, is not to be confined so as to exclude the procedural 
terms agreed by the parties.75 
And this is in this author’s opinion the correct interpretation. While it is true that 
appeal agreements deal with proceedings that are different from the arbitration 
proceedings, they are still very closely connected with the underlying arbitration 
agreement as they aim to regulate the finality of the arbitral award. There is a substantial 
  
70 See Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan, above n 36, at [35]. 
71 See Kyocera Corp v Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc, above n 47, at 1000; Tibor Varady “On the 
Option of a Contractual Extension of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards - Or: What is Actually Pro-
Arbitration?” (2006) 56 Zbornik PFZ 455 at 472–473. 
72 See Gaillard and Savage, above n 54, at [389 and 410]; but see Umar A Oseni and Hunud Abia Kadouf 
“The Discrimination Conundrum in the Appointment of Arbitrators in International Arbitration” (2012) 29 
J Int’l Arb 519 at 542 (arguing the rule of separability may also be applied to an arbitration clause and to 
any controversial clause within it). 
73 Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan, above n 36, at [43]. 
74 At [44]. 
75 At [44]. 
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link between provisions relating to the arbitration process (or the finality of the arbitral 
award) and the arbitration agreement and that link should not be disregarded. It can 
hardly be said that they are more connected with the main contract than with the 
arbitration agreement. In addition, as the Supreme Court observed, the rationale for the 
separation of the arbitration agreement from the main contract (the tribunal’s ability to 
declare the main contract invalid without contradicting its jurisdiction) does not extend to 
situations where provisions relating to the arbitration process are at stake.76  
However, note should be taken of a recent decision of the United States Supreme 
Court on whether the arbitrator or a court is competent to rule on the validity of the 
arbitration agreement.77 The Court separated a provision within an arbitration agreement 
that gave the arbitrator “exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the 
enforceability of this Agreement”78 from the remaining arbitration agreement. It held that 
the application of the rule “does not depend on the substance of the remainder of the 
contract”.79 A minority of the Court dissented on the application of the separability 
doctrine, holding: “[T]hat the subject matter of the agreement is exclusively arbitration 
makes all the difference”.80 
C. Severability of such agreements 
Since the doctrine of separability does not apply to appeal clauses, the question remains 
whether an appeal clause invalidates the entire arbitration agreement. 
In common law jurisdictions this is a matter to be resolved according to the doctrine 
of severance; in Switzerland and other civil law countries the doctrine of partial nullity 
applies.  
  
76 At [43] and 44]. 
77 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc v Jackson 561 US 63 (2010). 
78 At 71. 
79 At 71–72. 
80 At 77 per Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor dissenting. 
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On a few occasions courts simply assumed without examining the issue that the 
arbitration agreement was valid despite the offending clause.81 Where however the 
validity of the arbitration agreement was in dispute, the courts of the various jurisdictions 
applied different tests to determine if the arbitration agreement could be upheld. 
Three fundamentally different approaches can be found in the jurisdictions examined 
in this paper. Switzerland and some jurisdictions in the United States follow an approach 
that inquires into the actual or hypothetical subjective intentions of the parties: Would the 
parties have entered into the agreement without the clause to be severed? 
A second approach looks at the contract that the parties have agreed on and tries to 
preserve its character, thus asking: Will the agreement still be substantially the same 
without the clause to be severed?82 
A third approach puts more emphasis on the construction of the contract, examining if 
the parties’ performances can be divided and apportioned into corresponding pairs of part 
performances. The question then becomes: Does the agreement still provide pairs of 
promises of roughly equivalent value without the clause to be severed?83 
IV. Doctrines of severance and partial nullity 
A. The “but for”-test 
The probably most straightforward way84 to resolve the issue is to apply a “but for”-test, 
asking whether the parties would have entered into the agreement but for the illegal parts.  
  
81 See eg Bowen v Amoco Pipeline Co 254 F 3d 925 (10th Cir 2001) at 937; Saika v Gold 56 Cal Rptr 2d 
922 (Cal App 1996). 
82 Sir Jack Beatson, Andrew Burrows and John Cartwright Anson’s law of contract (29th ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 433. 
83 See E Allan Farnsworth Farnsworth on contracts (3rd ed, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2004) at 382. 
84 Notably, various legal scholars have assumed (without in-depth examination) that courts would apply a 
“but for”-test: see Raghavan, above n 19, at 123; Margaret Moses “Can Parties Tell Courts What to Do? 
Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards” (2004) 52 U Kan L Rev 429 at 462. 
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However, the outcome will not necessarily be the same wherever the “but for”-test is 
applied, as it is dependent on the point of reference for the test: the very parties with all 
their flaws and eccentricities or the parties as reasonable persons acting in good faith? 
1. The “but for”-test in the United States 
a) The pure “but for”-test 
The “but for”-test in its pure form is in the United States applied by Texan courts.85 
Under Texas law, the test of severability consists of two parts. The first is to determine if 
the illegal promise is the original consideration of the contract or merely incidental.86 
Severance is only possible in the latter case. The second part is the “but for”-test: “The 
issue as to severability is whether or not the parties would have entered into the 
agreement absent the illegal parts”.87  
The case of Whiteside v Griffis & Griffis, PC involved a dispute between a lawyer 
and the law firm where he previously used to work. He was promised a goodwill payment 
for not competing with the law firm within a radius of 300 miles. This promise was held 
to be in violation of Texas law.88 The findings of fact revealed that the law firm would 
not have agreed to pay a goodwill factor, had they known that the promise not to compete 
was void and unenforceable.89 It was also established that it would have been 
economically impossible for the law firm to make a goodwill payment to all departing 
shareholders.90 
The dispute in Rogers v Wolfson91 was between the sellers of one-half interest in a 
partnership (Rogers) and the buyer (Wolfson). The district court had, in a summary 
judgment, declined Rogers’ suit for money due under the sales contract because it found 
  
85 Jeremy L Zell “Discerning the Validity of Arbitration Agreements Containing Heightened Judicial 
Review Clauses after Hall Street Associations, LLC v Mattel, Inc” 40 Loy U Chi LJ 959 at 969. 
86 Rogers v Wolfson 763 SW 2d 922 (Tex Ct App 1989) at 925; Whiteside v Griffis & Griffis, PC 902 SW 
2d 739 (Tex App-Austin 1995) at 744. 
87 McFarland v Haby 589 SW 2d 521 (Tex Civ App 1979) at 524; Rogers v Wolfson, above n 86, at 925. 
88 Whiteside v Griffis & Griffis, PC, above n 86, at 743–744. 
89 At 745. 
90 At 745. 
91 Rogers v Wolfson, above n 86. 
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some ancillary provisions of the sales contract to be illegal under Texas antitrust laws.92 
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeal held in favour of Rogers. Given that the illegal 
provisions were solely to the benefit of Rogers who had first indicated their illegality and 
then nevertheless consummated the sale, the Court of Appeal found that the parties would 
have entered into the agreement without the illegal provisions.93  
The crucial point in time to determine the parties’ intent is the time of the execution 
of the agreement.94 The point of reference seems to be the intention of the parties as they 
then were: The Courts will in principle rely on factual evidence on the parties’ subjective 
intent,95 although they tend to validate the factual findings by considering which course 
of action they deem reasonable.96 
b) The modified “but for”-test: Oklahoma and Alaska 
Oklahoma and Alaska courts apply what could be called a modified version of the 
“but for”-test: The goal of the analysis is to determine whether the illegal part is an 
essential part of the agreed exchange, the rationale being that then the parties would not 
have entered into the agreement at all without it. The Supreme Court of Alaska explained 
this in Zerbetz:97  
If a provision that the court must excise is an “essential part of the agreed exchange,” 
the court cannot be sure that in that provision’s absence the parties would have 
agreed at all. In that case the court should not enforce what remains of the 
agreement. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma followed Zerbetz in Hargrave:98  
The enforceability of the remaining portions is dependent upon the expectations of 
the parties. If the invalid contractual provision is an essential part of the agreement 
  
92 At 923. 
93 At 925. 
94 McFarland v Haby, above n 87, at 524: “At the time of signing the contract, Mrs. Haby apparently 
gained the impression that by contract she could agree not to make a will, and at the same time control the 
disposition of her estate in many respects. Our view is that Mrs. Haby would not have signed the contract 
absent the provisions controlling the disposition of her estate.” 
95 See Whiteside v Griffis & Griffis, PC, above n 86, at 745; McFarland v Haby, above n 87, at 524. 
96 See Whiteside v Griffis & Griffis, PC, above n 86, at 745; Rogers v Wolfson, above n 86, at 925; 
McFarland v Haby, above n 87, at 524. 
97 Zerbetz v Alaska Energy Center 708 P 2d 1270 (Alaska 1985) at 1282–1283. 
98 Hargrave v Canadian Valley Electric Cooperative, Inc 792 P 2d 50 (Okl 1990) at 60. 
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and the parties would not have agreed absent that provision, then the entire contract 
is unenforceable. 
When examining an arbitration agreement that contained an illegal attorney fee 
provision, the District Court of Northern Oklahoma held, applying Hargrave:99 
The primary purpose of this arbitration agreement is to provide a mechanism to 
resolve employment related disputes. The court finds the attorney fee provision is 
not an “essential part” of the contract and, given the “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements,” concludes severance of the offending provision is 
appropriate. 
It does not appear that the Court examined whether the parties would have concluded 
the arbitration agreement absent the illegal provision. Rather, the court determined if the 
illegal clause was an essential part according to an objective standard. This can be seen as 
a shortcut as it allows the courts to apply their own judgement as an objective standard 
instead of having to rely on evidence of the parties’ subjective intentions.  
2. The “but for”-test in Switzerland  
The “but for”-test is what Swiss legislation prescribes in the Code of Obligations. The 
pertinent provision is art 20 of the Code of Obligations:100  
(1) A contract is void if its terms are impossible, unlawful or immoral.  
(2) However, where the defect pertains only to certain terms of a contract, those 
terms alone are void unless there is cause to assume that the contract would not have 
been concluded without them.  
The question whether the contract would have been concluded without the void terms 
is to be answered by ascertaining the putative or hypothetical intent of the parties, unless 
their actual intent can be proven.101 The hypothetical intent of the parties is to be 
determined by examining what the parties would have agreed on, had they known about 
the invalidity of the provision.102 The relevant point in time is the time of conclusion of 
  
99 Munoz v Green Country Imports, LLC Distr Ct, ND Okl 12–CV–322–GKF–FHM, 3 October 2012 at 5. 
100 Obligationenrecht 1911 (translation: Code of Obligations) (Switzerland), art 20 as per the semi-official 
translation on <www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19110009/index.html> (accessed 26 
September 2014). 
101 X v A AG [2005] 131 III BGE/ATF 467 at 470. 
102 X v A BGer 4C.156/2006, 17 August 2006 at consid 3.3. 
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the agreement.103 The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland, the Bundesgericht104 noted 
that there is a split of authorities as to the point of reference: Some legal scholars argue 
the court should ask what reasonable parties acting in good faith would have agreed on. 
Other scholars think the court should ask what the specific parties to the dispute would 
have agreed on; only if this cannot be established should the court rely on the objective 
intentions of the parties acting in good faith.105 The Bundesgericht suggested that the two 
opinions might be reconciled if the inquiry into the objective intentions of reasonable 
parties was based on the parties to the dispute rather than some reasonable model parties 
and if all the circumstances relating to the contract are taken into account.106 Indeed, this 
seems to have been the preferred approach in a number of older judgments, where it was 
held that the court should consider the contract in its entirety and its goals as well as all 
the circumstances.107 
When in doubt, partial voidness is to be preferred over full voidness of the contract 
according to the principle of in favorem validatis.108 Therefore, the burden of proof lies 
with the party arguing full voidness of the agreement.109 If however no hypothetical 
agreement of the parties may be ascertained then the whole contract is void.110 
In a recent decision the Bundesgericht applied the rules of art 20 of the Code of 
Obligations to an arbitration agreement in a dispute between an agent company and a 
football club.111 The agreement appointed alternatively two commissions of the FIFA112 
and the UEFA113 as the competent instance to decide the case. However, both 
commissions did not have jurisdiction on disputes such as the case at hand. The Court 
therefore held that this part of the agreement was impossible pursuant to art 20(1) of the 
  
103 Y v X [1984] 110 Ia BGE/ATF 59 at 63; A v B SA [1997] 124 III BGE/ATF 57 at 60; X v A, above n 102 
at consid 3.1. 
104 Translation: Swiss Federal Court. 
105 X v A, above n 102 at consid 3.3. 
106 X v A, above n 102 at consid 3.3. 
107 See eg Y v X, above n 103, at 63. 
108 X v A, above n 102 at consid 3.2; Football club X v Y Sàrl [2011] 138 III BGE/ATF 29 at 39. 
109 X v A, above n 102 at consid 3.2. 
110 X v A, above n 102 at consid 3.4. 
111 Football club X v Y Sàrl, above n 108. 
112 Fédération Internationale de Football Association. 
113 Union of European Football Associations. 
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Code of Obligations and consequently invalid.114 The question was thus whether the 
parties would have chosen to agree on arbitration, had they known about the invalidity of 
the appointment. The circumstances of the case, in particular the fact that two alternative 
commissions had been appointed, made it clear that the parties were not fixated on one 
specific institution.115 Therefore, the Court found that the parties would still have opted 
for arbitration and upheld the remainder of the arbitration agreement.116 It found that the 
parties hypothetically would have agreed on an arbitral tribunal specialised on sports 
matters, i.e. the CAS/TAS, which had eventually admitted jurisdiction.117 The Court 
backed up its reasoning by noting that the CAS/TAS would have been competent to 
review the decision of the FIFA commission on appeal if the latter had accepted 
jurisdiction.118 
In an interesting line of argument, the appellant submitted that it was deprived of its 
rights of appeal to the CAS/TAS due to the CAS/TAS admitting direct jurisdiction. The 
Court rejected this argument by noting that this issue followed directly from the lack of 
jurisdiction of the FIFA commission. It added that the appellant had failed to show how 
the parties would have insisted on the possibility of appeals at any rate.119 
The degree of leniency shown in this case by the Bundesgericht towards arbitral 
tribunals that have admitted jurisdiction based on imperfect arbitration agreements is not 
unparalleled.120 The Bundesgericht had previously admitted the validity of an arbitration 
agreement that provided an impossible procedure to appoint the tribunal.121 
Swiss case law thus suggests that a party wishing to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement based on an invalid appeal clause must be able to furnish substantive evidence 
that it would not have agreed to arbitrate in the first place without rights of appeal. 
  
114 Football club X v Y Sàrl, above n 108, at 37–38. 
115 At 38. 
116 At 39. 
117 At 38–39. 
118 At 39–40. 
119 At 40. 
120 See generally Luca Beffa “Decision 4A_246/2011 or the Leniency of the Swiss Federal Tribunal 
Towards Pathological Clauses” (2012) 30 ASA Bull 169 at 174–176. 
121 A AG v B NV [2003] 130 III BGE/ATF 66 at 73–74. 
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3. The “but for”-test in Continental Europe 
The “but for”-test is the prevailing standard not only in Switzerland, but also in 
continental Europe, in particular in Germany122 and France.123 In France, the Paris Cour 
d’appel held in the case of Société de Diseno v. Société Mendes an appeal agreement to 
be null and void.124 Regarding the question whether the arbitration agreement may 
survive the nullity of the appeal provision, the Court found that said provision constituted 
an element of the arbitration agreement that was essential and decisive for the consent of 
the parties, which had affirmed in this way their wish to submit their dispute to two levels 
of jurisdiction:125 
Considérant que cette clause est en conséquence frappée d’une nullité qui affecte 
dans son ensemble la convention d’arbitrage dont elle constitue un élément essentiel, 
déterminant du consentement des parties qui ont ainsi affirmé leur volonté de 
soumettre leur litige à deux degrés de juridiction; … 
Accordingly, the whole arbitration clause was invalid. While the wording seems to 
indicate that the Court relied on the provision being both an essential element and a 
decisive factor for the parties’ consent, French legal scholars perceive the Court’s 
reasoning as a “but for”-test.126 
4. Appraisal of the “but for”-test 
a) Rejection of the “but for”-test in the Commonwealth 
The “but for”-test has not been accepted in the Commonwealth jurisdictions.  
In the case of Alec Lobb (Garage) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd, the defendant, 
Total, had granted a leaseback of property subject to tie provisions to supply all the petrol 
  
122 § 139 of the Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) provides: „Ist ein Teil eines Rechtsgeschäfts nichtig, so 
ist das ganze Rechtsgeschäft nichtig, wenn nicht anzunehmen ist, dass es auch ohne den nichtigen Teil 
vorgenommen sein würde.” (translation: “If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal 
transaction is void, if it cannot be assumed that it would have been undertaken even without the void part.”) 
123 See Norman S Marsh “The Severance of Illegality in Contract” 64 LQR 230 at 230. 
124 Société de Diseno v Société Mendes [1995] Revue de l’Arbitrage 263 (Cour d’Appel de Paris) at 266 
quoted after Varady, above n 71, at 467 n 37. 
125 Société de Diseno v Société Mendes, above n 124, at 267 quoted after Varady, above n 71, at 468 n 38. 
126 See Gaillard and Savage, above n 54, at [1597]; Laurence Franc “Contractual Modification of Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards: The French Position” (1999) 10 Am Rev Int’l Arb 215 at 222; but see Varady, 
above n 71, at 467–468. 
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for the business. The Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that the tie provisions, 
if invalid, were severable from the valid and enforceable parts of the lease and 
leaseback:127 
The contract is of course changed by the excision of the tie, and obviously Total 
would not have granted a lease-back which did not contain such a tie. But I do not 
think that is good enough to prevent severance and lead to the conclusion that the 
whole of the lease and lease-back is void. 
In Marshall, the same court held:128  
But it is often and perhaps usually the case that the promise would not have been 
given but for the invalid restraint, yet this does not prevent the contract from being 
enforced without the invalid provision… 
Along the same lines, the Singapore High Court held, quoting from Restrictive 
Covenants under Common and Competitive Law,129 that “even if the covenantee would 
not have entered the agreement without the covenant, the contract may not be invalidated 
as a whole if there is consideration independent of the covenant”.130 
In the Australian case of Carney v Herbert, the defendant suggested using a “but for”-
test, arguing that the counterparty would have declined to enter into the contract without 
the void provision.131 The Privy Council did not “accept the relevance of any such 
inquiry” and thus rejected the argument.132  
Most recently, the Supreme Court of New Zealand contemplated in Carr the 
appropriate test of severability with regard to appeal agreements. While it did not 
explicitly reject the “but for”-test, it did emphasise that the approach it applied in the 
judgment was not a subjective inquiry into the parties’ intentions.133 
  
127 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 173 (CA) at 181. 
128 See Marshall v NM Financial Management Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1527 (UKCA) at 1532. 
129 Alexandra Kamerling and Christopher Osman Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition 
Law (5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2007) at 45. 
130 Wong Bark Chuan David v Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd [2007] SGHC 5, 2 SLR 22 (SGHC) at [213]. 
131 Carney v Herbert [1985] AC 301 (PC) at 316. 
132 At 316. 
133 Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan, above n 36, at [66]. 
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To summarise, the courts of the Commonwealth have always, when dealing with the 
issue of severability, applied tests that were based on an objective analysis of the 
agreement rather than on an inquiry into the subjective intentions of the parties. 
b) Grounds for rejection of the “but for”-test 
Why do the courts of the Commonwealth reject the “but for”-test? 
In Alec Lobb the defendant, Total, had granted the plaintiffs a leaseback of property 
subject to tie provisions to supply all the petrol for the business of the plaintiffs.134. The 
Court found, however, the purportedly invalid provision to be a reasonable and therefore 
valid restraint of trade clause.135 In an obiter dictum the Court observed that Total, if it 
had imposed an invalid restraint of trade, could not have argued that it would not have 
entered into the contract absent the illegal tie136. 
In Marshall the plaintiff, who had been engaged as a self-employed sales agent by the 
defendant, had been promised a post-termination commission. The promise was 
purportedly given in exchange for a promise not to compete with the defendant, which 
was found to be an unreasonable restraint of trade.137 The defendant tried to avoid its 
promise being enforced by arguing that it would not have given the promise without the 
invalid restraint of trade.138 The Court held that this did not prevent severance.139 The 
Court then found that the payments to the sales agent were in substance not consideration 
for the promise not to compete but for the sales agent’s previous services.140  
Marshall and Alec Lobb have in common that they both dealt with an actually or 
allegedly unreasonably wide promise, which had been imposed by and was to the sole 
benefit of the counterparty. There were therefore certainly good reasons not to give effect 
to the counterparty’s argument that they would not have entered into the agreement 
absent the invalid clause. However, the two cases are hardly comparable to the case of 
  
134 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd, above n 127, at 173. 
135 At 180 and 191. 
136 At 181 and 192. 
137 Marshall v NM Financial Management Ltd, above n 128, at 1528. 
138 At 1531. 
139 At 1532. 
140 At 1534. 
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appeal agreements: An appeal clause is, as a matter of principle, neutral, i.e. of equal 
value to both parties and therefore not to the benefit of one party.141 Of course, it is very 
much to the benefit of the party that lost in the arbitral proceedings, but this is not due to 
its construction but to the outcome of the arbitration.142  
For the same reason the rationale of Carney does not apply either: The Carney court 
was concerned with an agreement for the sale of shares in a company, and in particular 
with an illegal mortgage, which had been promised as a security for the purchase price by 
Carney, the buyer of the shares.143 When the mortgage was found to be illegal and void, 
Carney, who had not yet paid the full purchase price, argued that the counterparty would 
not have agreed to the sale absent the mortgage provision.144 The Privy Council, having 
noted that the sellers were ready to proceed without the mortgage, rejected this argument 
and went on to hold:145 
Subject to a caveat that it is undesirable, if not impossible, to lay down any 
principles which will cover all problems in this field, their Lordships venture to 
suggest that, as a general rule, where parties enter into a lawful contract of, for 
example, sale and purchase, and there is an ancillary provision which is illegal but 
exists for the exclusive benefit of the plaintiff, the court may and probably will, if the 
justice of the case so requires, and there is no public policy objection, permit the 
plaintiff if he so wishes to enforce the contract without the illegal provision. 
As an appeal clause is not to the sole benefit of one party, the general rule formulated 
in Carney, under which a “but for”-test must be rejected, does not apply to appeal 
agreements.  
Applying a “but for”-test means that literally each case will turn on its facts. The 
construction of the agreement becomes less important than the motivation of the parties 
to opt for arbitration in the first place. If, for instance, it can be shown that one party 
insisted on including an appeal clause, then the courts will find it difficult to uphold the 
arbitration agreement against that party’s will. Should however the clause be part of a 
  
141 But see, for an exception, Beynon v Garden Grove Medical Group (1980) 100 Cal App 3d 698, at 704, 
n 2, 161 Cal Rptr 146, at 149, n 2. 
142 Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan [2012] NZHC 1537, [2012] 3 NZLR 97 (HC) at [42]. 
143 Carney v Herbert, above n 131, at 301. 
144 At 316. 
145 At 317. 
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boilerplate arbitration agreement, which the parties inserted into a contract without 
deliberating on it, then the courts will be more inclined to enforce the arbitration 
agreement. 
While the parties’ negotiations gain thus considerable weight, the key is—as long as a 
pure “but for”-test is applied—the subjective intention of one party, which did not even 
need to be indicated to the counterparty.  
Courts and legal scholars aim to counter-balance the danger of relying on a party’s 
purely subjective intentions by applying modified, more objective standards. In this 
author’s view, this is not wholly persuasive nor is it consistent with the idea of a “but 
for”-test. While the motivation is understandable, this author suggests that a preferable 
approach would be to combine the “but for”-test as a (purely) subjective inquiry with the 
test of severance applied in the Commonwealth as an objective inquiry.146 
B. The test examining the effect on the nature of the promises 
1. The test in the Commonwealth 
In the past, legal scholars in the Commonwealth put forward, and the courts of the 
Commonwealth applied, differing criteria to examine whether a part of a contract may be 
severed.147 Requirements that in the recent past needed to be met before severance was 
permitted are as follows:  
a) The promise to be severed must be of such a kind that can be severed (thus 
excluding criminal or immoral promises).148  
b) The court must not be forced to redraft the contract (“blue pencil” test).149  
  
146 See below IV.B.4. 
147 Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd [1975] AC 561 (PC) at 578; 
Beatson, Burrows and Cartwright, above n 82, at 433. 
148 Bennett v Bennett [1952] 1 KB 249 (CA) at 253/254; Goodinson v Goodinson [1954] 2 QB 118 (CA) at 
120; Carney v Herbert, above n 131, at 311; Edwin Peel The Law of Contract (13th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2010) at [11–160]; Beatson, Burrows and Cartwright, above n 82, at 433; MP Furmston Cheshire, 
Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of contract (16th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) at 529. 
149 Attwood v Lamont [1920] 3 KB 571 (CA) at 578 per Lord Sterndale MR; Peel, above n 148, at [11–
161]; Beatson, Burrows and Cartwright, above n 82, at 435. 
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c) Severance must not alter the nature of the agreement.150 
d) The promise to be severed must not be substantially the whole consideration for 
the other party’s enforceable promise.151 
Criteria (b) and (c) are perceived by some authors to only apply in cases of severance 
where a promise is to be reduced instead of being entirely eliminated from a contract.152 
But with regard to criterion (c), this view seems impossible to reconcile with the more 
recent cases of Hashwani, Carney and Carr, where the courts asked whether the nature of 
the agreement would be changed.153  
Agreeing on appeal rights is neither a crime nor immoral—thus, the first requirement 
will generally be met. The “blue pencil” test should normally be satisfied, too—at least in 
the cases that have become public no contract reformation was necessary.154 The main 
emphasis in cases concerning appeal agreements will therefore usually lie on the 
requirements (c) and (d).  
But the test (d) of whether the promise is substantially the whole consideration for the 
other party’s enforceable promise is in this author’s opinion not useful when examining 
appeal clauses. As stated above, an appeal clause is, as a matter of principle, neutral.155 
That is to say both parties promise each other the same: to allow an appeal from the 
arbitration award. Both parties’ consideration is thus contained in the very same clause, 
both parties lose exactly the same consideration through severance of said clause, and 
there remain, at the very least, still the promises to arbitrate from both parties. It is 
  
150 Attwood v Lamont, above n 149, at 578 and 580 per Lord Sterndale MR; Carney v Herbert, above n 131, 
at 310 and 316; Peel, above n 148, at [11–164]; Beatson, Burrows and Cartwright, above n 82, at 436. 
151 Bennett v Bennett, above n 148, at 261; Goodinson v Goodinson, above n 148, at 123/124; Marshall v 
NM Financial Management Ltd, above n 128, at 1532; Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd (formerly known as E D 
& F Man International (S) Pte Ltd) v Wong Bark Chuan David [2007] SGCA 53, [2008] 1 SLR 663 at 
[128]; Furmston, above n 148, at 530; Beatson, Burrows and Cartwright, above n 82, at 435–436; Peel, 
above n 148, at [11–153]. 
152 See Furmston, above n 148, at 531-534; John Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd Law of contract 
in New Zealand (4th ed, LexisNexis NZ, Wellington, 2012) at 537. 
153 See Carney v Herbert, above n 131, at 316; Hashwani v Jivraj [2010] EWCA Civ 712, [2010] Bus LR 
1683 at [31]; Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan, above n 36, at [67]–[72]. 
154 See Kyocera Corp v Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc, above n 47, at 990–991; Little v Auto 
Stiegler, Inc 63 P 3d 979 (Cal 2003) at 982–983; Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan, above n 36, at [67]. 
155 See above IV.A. 
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therefore a given in such cases that requirement (d) is met; this test amounts to an empty 
formula and should accordingly not be applied. 
In addition, one might look at it differently: In jurisdictions with opt-in statutes such 
as the United Kingdom and New Zealand156, an appeal clause could be regarded as too 
wide a promise because the parties to an arbitration agreement can only opt for appeals 
on questions of law (instead of appeals on questions of law and facts). Accordingly, the 
appeal clause would not need to be eliminated entirely but only to be reduced. This too 
would result in applying criterion (c) rather than (d). 
It is therefore no surprise that the Courts concerned with unenforceable clauses in 
arbitration agreements rather inquired into the effect of severance on the nature of the 
agreement than into the parties’ considerations.157 This also seems to be the approach 
favoured by Gary B Born who submits:158  
The proper analysis in such cases is one of ascertaining the parties’ intentions: was 
the parties’ intention to arbitrate their disputes altered or undone by virtue of the 
invalidation or ineffectiveness of one term of their agreement to arbitrate. 
The Singapore Court of Appeal recently held in Man Financial that the English 
position on the doctrine of severance represented the current Singapore position.159 The 
Court formulated the basic test concerning the severance of entire clauses in a contract as 
whether the objectionable promise “is substantially the whole or the main consideration 
for the promise sought to be enforced”160, thus applying criterion (d). This is, as stated 
above, not the current English position anymore and, most of all, not an appropriate test 
of severability for appeal clauses. It is doubtful if Singapore courts, when concerned with 
unenforceable clauses in arbitration agreements, would follow Man Financial. 
  
156 See above II.C. 
157 See Hashwani v Jivraj, above n 153, at [31]; Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan, above n 36, at [67]–[72]. 
158 Gary B Born International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, Austin, 2014) 
vol 1 at 914. 
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2. The English case of Hashwani v Jivraj 
In the recent case of Hashwani161 the Court of Appeal of England and Wales had to 
examine an arbitration agreement prescribing that all members of the tribunal be 
members of the Ismaili community (a branch of Islam).162 The Court held that this clause 
was in violation of the applicable employment law.163 Applying the aforementioned 
principles, the Court noted that the “blue pencil” test was easily satisfied as just one 
sentence needed to be struck out.164 Severance, however, was only possible “if it does not 
render that which remains substantially different from that which the parties originally 
intended.”165 In this respect the Court observed that the ability to influence the 
composition of the arbitral tribunal through the appointment of its members was often 
viewed of fundamental importance. The Court therefore found that the clause formed an 
integral part of the arbitration agreement und could accordingly not be severed.166 It 
should be noted in this regard that this case is an example of an examination before the 
arbitration. 
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court held that the employment law provisions considered 
by the Court of Appeal did not apply to the clause in dispute; accordingly, the entire 
arbitration agreement was valid.167 The Supreme Court therefore did not examine the 
question of severability.168 
The approach of the Court of Appeal on severability has been criticised. Some 
commentators submitted that the issue should have been resolved applying the doctrine of 
separability.169 As has been explained above, this paper favours restricting the application 
of the doctrine of separability to cases where the main contract is invalid.170  
  
161 Hashwani v Jivraj, above n 153. 
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165 At [31]. 
166 At [34]. 
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Another commentator suggested, “where the overwhelming objective of a defective 
clause is to have disputes resolved by arbitration”, the court should “simply excise the 
objectionable provision”.171 This is not substantially different from the approach of the 
Court of Appeal: It is simply a matter of framing the “overwhelming objective” or 
character or nature of the contract—here: the arbitration agreement. While that 
commentator defined the overwhelming objective of the agreement as “to have disputes 
resolved by arbitration”, the Court found the overwhelming objective was to have 
disputes resolved by Ismaili arbitrators.  
This author thinks that it is difficult to judge without having knowledge of the facts of 
the case. However, the absence of a clause empowering the tribunal to act ex aequo et 
bono or apply anything else than English law172 seems to indicate that the religion of the 
arbitrators might not have been so central to the agreement such as to prevent severance. 
3. The New Zealand case of Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan 
In the more elaborate decision in Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan, the Supreme Court of 
New Zealand ultimately followed the same approach. In this case, the parties had entered 
into an arbitration agreement to refer their differences to a sole arbitrator “whose award 
shall be final and binding on the parties (subject to clause 1.2).”173 Clause 1.2 of the 
agreement provided for appeals on „questions of law and fact“.174  
In a partial award the arbitrator had dismissed Mr Carr’s claim. The High Court 
allowed Mr Carr’s application to set aside the award as it found that the agreement was 
entirely invalid under the law of New Zealand due to the clause on appeals.175 The Court 
applied an approach formulated by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in 
Brew v. Whitlock (No.2)176 as adopted by the High Court of Australia in Humphries177:178 
  
171 Samuel Adam “Discrimination: Should the Debate end despite the Decision on Jivraj v Hashwani?” 
[2011] 4 The Resolver 8 at 8. 
172 See Hashwani v Jivraj, above n 153, at [29]. 
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176 Brew v Whitlock (No 2) [1967] VicRp 102, (1967) 1967 VR 803 (SC Full Court). 
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In that case the Full Court said that … “once the conclusion is reached that the 
invalid promise is so material and important a provision in the whole bargain that 
there should be inferred an intention not to make a contract which would operate 
without it”, the invalid promise should be treated as inseverable from the contract. 
Gallaway Cook Allan then appealed against the High Court’s judgment. The Court of 
Appeal allowed their appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment.179 The Court 
interpreted the analysis of the High Court as a “but for”-test and rejected it, citing Carney 
v Herbert.180 The Court found that the right of appeal was merely ancillary, whereas the 
primary consideration passing from each party was the agreement to submit to arbitration, 
which had been fully performed.181 
Upon appeal by Mr Carr, the Supreme Court of New Zealand reinstated the High 
Court’s judgment setting aside the arbitral award.182  
Having examined the approaches applied in Carney183, Humphries184 and Kyocera185, 
the Supreme Court summarized the principles of severability as follows:186 
The overall approach to severability that emerges from these decisions is one that is 
founded on core contractual principles. The significance of severance of an invalid 
contractual provision is evaluated in the course of examination of what the parties 
are to be taken to have agreed in the words they used. This is an issue of construction 
of the contract. It is likely to be permissible to sever an invalid promise which is 
subsidiary to the main purpose of the contract, but severance may not destroy the 
main purpose and substance of what has been agreed. Severance cannot be permitted 
to alter the nature of a contract. 
The Court found that the approach applied in Humphries—to assess “whether a 
provision was so material and important to the parties’ bargain that no intention could be 
                                                                                                                                                 
178 Carr v Gallaway Cook Allan, above n 142, at [40]. 
179 Gallaway Cook Allan v Carr [2013] NZCA 11, [2013] 1 NZLR 826 (CA). 
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183 Carney v Herbert, above n 131. 
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inferred to enter a contract without it”187—was based on objective manifestation of 
contractual intentions and did not involve a subjective inquiry. It was therefore not a “but 
for”-test:188 
The approach is one way of establishing whether applying the doctrine of severance 
would leave the subject matter of the contract and the primary obligations of the 
parties unchanged: it is an expression, in different words, of the first stage of inquiry 
into the severability referred to in Carney. 
The Court then turned to applying this test to the case in point:189 
[68] The nature of the transaction entered into by the parties was to submit their 
dispute to the award and decision of the nominated arbitrator for final and binding 
determination, with an important reservation concerning their agreement that the 
arbitrator’s award would be final. The submission of the dispute to arbitration was 
stated to be subject to cl 1.2, being the term that provided for appeal on questions of 
law and fact. The parties’ mutual undertaking to carry out any award without delay 
was also subject to that qualification in cl 1.2. ... 
[69] Whether this provision goes to the very nature of their contract (and not merely 
its extent), and whether it was so material and important a provision in their 
agreement to submit the dispute to arbitration that objectively there should be 
inferred an intention not to submit the dispute to arbitration without it, is really the 
same issue. It is an issue of construction of their contract. 
[70] In the present case, the parties indicated in their agreement to arbitrate the 
degree of importance that they attributed to the scope of their ability to challenge the 
award on appeal. Their italicisation of the words “questions of law and fact”, 
followed by the notation “(emphasis added)” made clear, objectively, that the scope 
of the appeal right did go to the heart of their agreement to submit their dispute to 
arbitration. … While that may not always be the position with a provision in an 
arbitration agreement that purports to expand recourse to the courts from what the 
Act permits, it is undoubtedly so in this instance. The dispute was submitted to 
arbitration on this basis. 
A minority of the Court dissented on grounds of art 34(2)(a)(iv) of sch 2 of the 
Arbitration Act 1996. This provision allows setting aside an award “if the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties”, except if the 
agreement was in conflict with a provision of sch 2 of the Arbitration Act 1996 “from 
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which the parties cannot derogate”.190 The minority argued that deviation from the appeal 
agreement was accordingly not a sufficient ground to set aside the award, as the parties 
are not allowed to contractually opt for an appeal:191  
[I]f parties choose to utilise arbitration to resolve their disputes, they will be treated 
as being bound by those aspects of the arbitral process from which they cannot 
legally derogate whatever they might agree. 
To summarize the majority of the Court’s findings, it held that the appeal clause—due 
to the obvious emphasis the parties had placed on it—went to the very nature of the 
arbitration agreement.192 Deleting it would accordingly alter the nature of the 
agreement—hence, severance was not possible. The Court was apparently cautious to 
confine its judgment to the rather extraordinary facts presented to it.  
4. Appraisal of the Commonwealth test 
In this author’s submission, it is in the nature of arbitration agreements that the result 
of this test of severability must be the same in almost every case concerning appeal 
agreements, for the following reason:  
Arbitration is not just another form of litigation that starts in a tribunal instead of a 
court, a mere „prelude to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review 
process“.193 As Gary B Born puts it: “One of the most fundamental purposes of the 
arbitral process is to obtain a speedy, final resolution of the parties’ disputes, without the 
costs and delays of litigation.”194 Consequently, the finality of the arbitral award is widely 
regarded as one of the key features of arbitration both by legal scholars195 and (according 
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to a 2006 study among major international corporations)196 by most parties to 
international arbitration agreements197. 
When parties submit their dispute to arbitration, while retaining full rights of appeal 
to the courts, then it can hardly be said that they have consented to real arbitration. 
Rather, it seems, they had in mind, and thus contracted for, a trial of first instance in a 
different procedural setting. Against this background, it is, in this author’s view, fair to 
say that eliminating an appeal clause from an arbitration agreement changes the very 
nature of the arbitration agreement. 
But this paper ventures to submit that the result should not be determined by this test 
alone in all cases. The test is reasonable on its own if a decision is reached before the start 
of the arbitration because it leaves the parties with the opportunity to nevertheless agree 
on arbitration. If, however, the arbitration process is already finished and an award has 
been rendered, then the parties cannot anymore simply evaluate the advantages and 
disadvantages of arbitration against litigation. They already know the outcome of 
arbitration, and at least one of the parties will be dissatisfied with it. Therefore, the parties 
do not have a fair chance anymore to agree on arbitration—unless on a new arbitration, 
which however makes no sense in terms of allocation of resources.  
Against this background, the change of the nature of the arbitration agreement 
through severance should not be enough to refrain from it. Rather, an additional 
requirement should be established in such cases to make up for the parties’ lost chance to 
opt for arbitration: the “but for”-test. The arbitration agreement should only then be 
invalidated when it can be shown that at the time the parties would not have agreed on 
arbitration absent the appeal clause. Taking into account the pro-arbitration policy, which 
the laws of New Zealand198 the United Kingdom199 and Singapore200 have in common, 
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the burden of proof should lie with the party seeking to invalidate the arbitration 
agreement. 
The hypothetical outcome of a “but for”-test in Carr remains obscure. It is 
noteworthy though that Gallaway Cook Allan, not Mr Carr, had brought up the idea of 
the rights of appeal.201 While Mr Carr instantly agreed to the idea,202 it is unclear whether 
Gallaway Cook Allan would have insisted on an appeal clause, as both parties must have 
been interested in keeping the dispute secret. 
C. The test of interconnectedness of the valid and invalid clauses 
1. The basic test 
When determining if an illegal clause may be severed from a contract, United States 
courts often ask whether legal and illegal contractual provisions are integrated and 
interdependent.203 The inquiry is to determine if the parties’ promises can each be divided 
and apportioned into corresponding pairs.204  
Under Virginia law, “when a contract covers several subjects, some of whose 
provisions are valid and some void, those which are valid will be upheld if they are not so 
interwoven with those illegal as to make divisibility impossible”.205 The Court’s 
assessment of the provisions as being interwoven with one another often means nothing 
else but that the court inquires into whether they are supported by a separate 
consideration: Thus, in Alston Studios the illegal provision, an excessive restraint of 
trade, could not be severed without severing the clause containing the compensation for 
the covenant not to compete.206  
The same holds true for Kentucky where the general rule is that severance is 
permitted if the illegal covenant can be eliminated from the contract without impairing its 
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symmetry as a whole and without altering or destroying the general meaning and purpose 
of the contract.207 In Edleson severance was allowed because the illegal provision was 
said to carry its own consideration rather than constitute any consideration for any other 
provision of the contract:208  
Its elimination will not impair the contract, as a whole, or in anywise affect any other 
provision of it, and hence might be properly considered an independent covenant 
carrying with it the relief for its breach independently of the performance or non-
performance of any other covenant in the contract. 
The position prevailing in Kentucky was adopted in Indiana.209 Accordingly, a 
provision for confession of judgment contained in a sale contract was held to be severable 
because it could be eliminated „without destroying the symmetry as a whole“.210 
In Florida the test is if “the illegal portion of the contract does not go to its essence”, 
and if “there still remains of the contract valid legal promises on one side which are 
wholly supported by valid legal promises on the other.”211 The Supreme Court of Florida 
applied this standard when examining arbitration agreements that contained an illegal 
provision in the cases Shotts212 and Gessa213. In Shotts, the arbitration agreement 
provided, inter alia, that the arbitration be conducted in accordance with the arbitration 
rules of the American Health Lawyers Association (‘‘AHLA’’), which the Court found to 
be in violation of public policy.214 The Court held that the AHLA provision went „to the 
very essence of the agreement.“ Severance would require the Court “to rewrite the 
agreement and to add an entirely new set of procedural rules and burdens and standards, a 
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job that the trial court is not tasked to do.”215 Further, the Court noted it would be hard 
pressed to find that there still remained of the contract valid legal promises.216 
The offending clause in Gessa provided for a limitation of liability. The majority of 
the Court held that this provision constituted the “financial heart of the agreement”.217 It 
found that there would not remain of the contract valid legal promises, and therefore the 
provisions were not severable.218 A minority disagreed, holding that the financial heart of 
the agreement was instead to be found in the main agreement, whereas the arbitration 
agreement was a side agreement, determining the specifics of arbitration. There would 
have remained enough of it even after the illegal provision had been eliminated since the 
parties had agreed on a set of rules governing the arbitration including procedural rules, 
provisions on arbitrator’s and attorneys’ fees.219 
This author submits that Gessa should have been solved by applying the rule of 
separability220 instead of the doctrine of severance: The provisions on limitations of 
liability did in substance not form part of the agreement to arbitrate because they were not 
merely a limitation of powers of the arbitrator but a general limitation of liability,221 even 
though they were “incorporated by reference” into the arbitration agreement.222  
Where the test of severability consists in examining if enough valid promises remain 
of the contract, the test is essentially equal to the old Commonwealth requirement that the 
promise to be severed must not be substantially the whole consideration for the other 
party’s enforceable promise. It has been shown above that this test is not suited for 
arbitration agreements.223 
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The same holds true for tests of whether the illegality permeates other parts of the 
agreement or whether the clause is interdependent with other provisions. Those are 
inappropriate tests because they will result in severance in virtually all cases,224 without 
taking into account if the remaining contract is materially changed or if the parties had 
concluded the contract nevertheless.  
2. The Californian inquiry into the interests of justice  
The bulk of judgments on severability of appeal clauses in the United States was 
rendered applying Californian law. The Supreme Court of California summarized the 
basic principles of severance in Armendariz:225 
Courts are to look to the various purposes of the contract. If the central purpose of 
the contract is tainted with illegality, then the contract as a whole cannot be 
enforced. If the illegality is collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and the 
illegal provision can be extirpated from the contract by means of severance or 
restriction, then such severance and restriction are appropriate. 
Thus, the test of severability is in principle the same as in most States. However, 
when concerned with illegal provisions in arbitration agreements, Californian courts 
additionally examine whether the interests of justice would be furthered by severance.226  
a) The original purpose of the inquiry 
The inquiry as to the interests of justice was established in Armendariz227, citing 
Beynon228. Beynon was a rather extraordinary case, in which the defendants had imposed 
a provision (paragraph B) that gave them the right to reject any arbitral award.229 The 
arbitrators awarded the plaintiff USD 60,000 in damages. The defendants rejected the 
award, whereas the plaintiff moved to confirm the award. The Court of Appeal found that 
paragraph B violated public policy and was invalid. It then turned to the question of 
severance and cited a commentator’s note:230 
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Mr Witkins notes that “later California cases take a very loose view of severability, 
enforcing valid parts of an apparently indivisible contract where the interests of 
justice or the policy of the law (as the court conceives it) would be furthered.” 
However, the reasoning of the Court did not refer to the interests of justice. The Court 
simply held that paragraphs A and C constituted a complete and valid arbitration 
agreement and where thus “clearly severable from and untainted by the provisions of 
paragraph B”.231 Similarly, in later cases no reference was made to the interests of justice 
until it all of a sudden became the “overarching inquiry” in Armendariz.232 
The Armendariz court was confronted with a one-sided arbitration clause in an 
employment contract, which only required the employee to arbitrate and precluded 
several forms of damages.233 The Court noted that two reasons for severing illegal clauses 
appeared in case law:234  
The first is to prevent parties from gaining undeserved benefit or suffering 
undeserved detriment as a result of voiding the entire agreement—particularly when 
there has been full or partial performance of the contract. Second, more generally, 
the doctrine of severance attempts to conserve a contractual relationship if to do so 
would not be condoning an illegal scheme. The overarching inquiry is whether “‘the 
interests of justice … would be furthered’” by severance.  
The Court then held that the agreement contained more than one unlawful provision 
and that therefore it was not possible to strike a single provision in order to remove the 
unconscionable taint from the agreement.235 
Regarding the furthering of the interests of justice the Court observed that not 
severing the provisions in Beynon would have exactly fulfilled the illegal purpose of 
these provisions: to allow the defendants to invalidate the arbitration award.236 In 
Armendariz on the other hand, no such situation was present as the plaintiffs, on whom 
the unconscionable provisions had been imposed, had initiated court proceedings instead 
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of arbitration.237 Thus, while the interests of justice had required severance in Beynon, 
they did not in Armendariz.  
b) Recent case law on the inquiry 
In Little238 the Supreme Court of California had to rule on an arbitration agreement 
containing an effectively one-sided appeal clause providing for arbitral review. The 
Court, applying the principles set out in Armendariz, found that the appeal clause was the 
only unconscionable provision and could be severed leaving the rest of the arbitration 
agreement intact. Thus, no contract reformation was required.239 While the interests of 
justice were not mentioned, the Court remarked that the provision had not been drafted in 
bad faith.240  
The Second District Court of Appeal of California examined an appeal clause in an 
arbitration agreement in Crowell and found it to be invalid.241 The Court stated:242  
The provision for judicial review of the merits of the arbitration award was so central 
to the arbitration agreement that it could not be severed. To do so would be to create 
an entirely new agreement to which neither party agreed. … The parties to the 
contract here agreed to arbitration with judicial review of errors of law and fact. 
Without that provision, a different arbitration process results. 
It should be noted that the plaintiff had, in a complaint for declaratory relief, sought a 
judicial determination that the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable.243 The 
Court therefore rendered its judgment before arbitration proceedings had been initiated. 
Later that year, the First District Court of Appeal of California had to decide the case 
of Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Authority v CC Partners, which, too, involved an 
arbitration agreement containing an appeal clause.244 The Oakland-Alameda court 
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distinguished Crowell in two ways: First, the arbitral award had already been rendered.245 
Accordingly, the Court held that CC Partners would gain an undeserved benefit if the 
entire arbitration agreement were struck “when the arbitration itself suffered from no 
infirmity”.246 Second, the agreement in point contained a severance clause.247 
In the famous Kyocera decision, an arbitration agreement with an appeal clause was 
brought before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal.248 Applying Californian contract law, the 
Court found that the appeal clause should be severed.249 It noted that, as in Little, no 
contract reformation was required, the illegality did not permeate any other part of the 
arbitration clause and the appeal provisions were not interdependent with any other.250 It 
also held that the scope of judicial review was “not sufficiently central to the arbitration 
clause to defeat severability.”251 With regard to the interests of justice, the Court cited 
Oakland-Alameda and found that Kyocera would gain an undeserved benefit if the entire 
arbitration agreement were struck after the arbitration had been conducted impeccably.252 
The same court later applied Kyocera in Hall Street Associates253, a case from 
Oregon, holding that the evidence that the parties would not have concluded the 
arbitration agreement absent the appeal clause was “not strong enough to distinguish this 
case from Kyocera”.254 The case was brought before the Supreme Court.255 While Hall 
Street did not seek certiorari on the severance point,256 nothing in the Supreme Court’s 
decision indicates that it disagreed with the analysis. 
  
245 At 371. 
246 At 372. 
247 At 371. 
248 Kyocera Corp v Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc, above n 47. 
249 Kyocera Corp v Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc, above n 47. 
250 At 1001–1002. 
251 At 1002. 
252 At 1002. 
253 Hall Street Associates, LLC v Mattel, Inc 113 Fed Appx 272 (9th Cir 2004). 
254 At 273. 
255 See Hall Street Associates, LLC v Mattel, Inc, above n 25. 
256 At 587, n 6. 
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c) Appraisal of the inquiry 
The overview of the Californian case law suggests that the inquiry as to the interests 
of justice originally (in Beynon, Little and Armendariz) functioned as an estoppel against 
a party’s unfair invocation of the entire arbitration agreement’s invalidity. Moreover, it 
was closely linked to the question of who had drafted and would benefit from the invalid 
clause (given that more often than not the invalid clauses were one-sided). It was only in 
Oakland-Alameda and Kyocera that the Court applied it in a broader sense. And it seems 
to this author that the inquiry in these two cases was somewhat misguided.257 In this 
author’s opinion, the inquiry should be reserved for cases similar to the ones for which it 
had been established.  
Certainly, the courts were right in holding that Kyocera or CC Partners would gain an 
undeserved benefit if the whole of the parties’ arbitration agreement were to be found 
invalid “when the arbitration itself suffered from no infirmity”258. The courts failed to 
mention, though, that things would be entirely different if the arbitration did in fact suffer 
from an infirmity, especially from one that would have been likely to be corrected upon 
appeal. In such a case, it would of course be the counterparty that gained an undeserved 
benefit if only the appeal clause were to be found invalid. To determine which is true 
would, however, require the court to do exactly what legislation precludes it from doing: 
to assess whether the award contained errors of law or fact.  
The reason for the courts expanding the interests of justice-test was in this author’s 
submission the shortcoming of the Californian test of severability with regard to appeal 
clauses. The basic test of severability, as explained above, examines if the illegality is 
collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and the illegal provision can be extirpated 
from the contract by means of severance or restriction.259 This is an examination of the 
contract’s construction, that is to say: of the form rather than the substance of the 
  
257 But see Eric van Ginkel “‘Expanded’ Judicial Review Revisited: Kyocera Overturns LaPine” 4 Pepp 
Disp Resol L J 47 at 12 (arguing the Kyocera court should have made this the principal ground for 
severance). 
258 Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Authority v CC Partners, above n 244, at 372; Kyocera Corp v 
Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc, above n 47, at 1002. 
259 Armendariz v Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc, above n 225, at 696. 
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contract. While the test puts much emphasis on contract construction, it neither analyses 
whether the nature of the contract would be changed through severance nor whether the 
parties would have entered into the agreement absent the clause to be severed.  
The latter two elements however should, in this author’s opinion, be the heart of any 
test of severability. The appropriate test of severance in arbitration agreements consists of 
two elements, which can be phrased as the following two questions: Does it make a 
difference if the illegal part is deleted? And if so, would the parties have concluded the 
contract anyway? In legal terms, this means combining the test examining the effect of 
severance on the nature of the contract, as it is known in the Commonwealth, and the “but 
for”-test in its pure form. Only if neither of the two conditions can be satisfied should the 
entire arbitration agreement be invalidated.260 
V. Conclusions 
Appeal clauses in arbitration agreements raise a conflict between two of international 
arbitration’s most powerful principles: the autonomy of the parties and the finality of the 
award. When striking a balance between these two principles, the jurisdictions examined 
in this paper have—with some limited exceptions—clearly favoured the finality of the 
award. 
Thus, the validity of appeal agreements has either been denied by the courts or is very 
doubtful as appeal agreements interfere with statutory provisions aimed at protecting the 
finality of arbitral awards.  
However, the question of whether this invalidates the remainder of the arbitration 
agreement has been answered in more diverse ways. The different tests that are applied in 
the jurisdictions examined (based either on the common law doctrine of severance or the 
civil law doctrine of partial nullity) can be divided into three main approaches. All three 
approaches have their own shortcomings. 
Switzerland and some jurisdictions in the United States apply a “but for”-test, which 
inquires into whether the parties would have entered into the agreement without the 
  
260 See above IV.B.4. 
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invalid clause. The “but for”-test inquires only into the subjective intentions of the 
parties, thus enabling the losing party to argue that it would not have entered into the 
agreement absent the eliminated clause, without having regard to the objective effect on 
the arbitration agreement. 
The approach preferred in the Commonwealth permits severance unless it would alter 
the nature of the agreement. This test is persuasive regarding the objective element but 
lacks an element that inquires into the parties’ readiness to agree without the eliminated 
clause. Thus, it deprives the parties of the chance to still uphold the arbitration agreement, 
if they would have done so prior to the arbitration. 
The third approach, predominantly applied in the United States, puts the emphasis on 
the construction of the contract, allowing severance if the parties’ promises can be 
divided into distinct obligations. The downside of this test is that it examines neither the 
effect on the content of the contract nor the subjective intentions of the parties. Since 
appeal clauses are by nature distinct from the agreement to arbitrate, this test will allow 
severance every time, regardless of whether the character of the agreement is altered or 
whether the parties would have concluded it nevertheless. 
As has been shown, the inquiry most appropriate for appeal clauses in arbitration 
agreements is one that looks for the answers to the following two questions: whether the 
remaining agreement is still the same in its heart; and whether the parties would have 
concluded it nevertheless. The best inquiry in terms of the first question is the 
Commonwealth test. The second question is best answered by applying the “but for”-test 
in its pure form, that is to say: the “but for”-test looking into the subjective intentions of 
the parties. 
Accordingly, a combination of the “but for”-test in its pure form and the test 
examining whether the nature of the agreement remains unaltered appears to be the 
appropriate test.  
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